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Summary: This article analyses value changes of German stock market companies in 
response to movements of the US dollar. The approach followed in this work extends 
the standard means of measuring exchange rate exposure in several ways (e.g. by us-
ing multi-factor modelling instead of augmented CAPM, application of moving window 
panel regressions, orthogonalization of overall market risk vis-à-vis currency risk). The 
main innovation lies in testing implications of exchange rate adjustment costs (hedging 
costs) for firm values and exposure. Based on time series data of German DAX compa-
nies, DM/ dollar rates and macroeconomic factors, we find a rather unstable, time-
variant exposure of German stock market companies. Dollar sensitivity is positively af-
fected by the ratio of exports/GDP and negatively affected by imports/GDP as well as by 
significant deviations of the dollar price from its long-run median. The first two findings 
are in line with the presumption that exporting corporations benefit from dollar price in-
creases, whereas importing corporations benefit from dollar price decreases. The last 
finding can be explained by higher exchange rate adjustment costs in case of substan-
tial deviations from the long-run median level. Furthermore, there is indication of asym-
metric adjustment costs as effects from appreciations of domestic currency appear to be 
smaller than from depreciations.  
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1. Introduction 
Are German stock values vulnerable to exchange rate movements? Classical financial 
theory implies that stock market values of firms should be affected by foreign exchange 
rate risk (Dufey 1972, Shapiro 1974). However, according to standard international port-
folio choice models, optimally allocated world market portfolios hedge against exchange 
rate risk (Solnik 1974, Adler and Dumas 1983). To the extent that foreign exchange risk 
represents unsystematic risk, it can be diversified away, provided that investors and 
owners of equities have the same quality of information about the firm as management 
– a condition not likely to prevail in practice (Dufey and Giddy, 2003). Tests of predic-
tions derived from such theoretical considerations have been facilitated by the work of 
Adler and Dumas (1980, 1984), who have shown that exchange rate exposure can be 
measured as the sensitivity of stock returns to exchange rate movements within the 
simple framework of linear regression models.  
Econometric studies have been of limited success in identifying foreign currency expo-
sure (see Jorion 1990 and 1991, Bodnar and Gentry 1993, He and Ng 1998, 
Dominguez and Tesar 2001 a,b,c, Koutmos and Martin 2003, inter alia). If found in the 
data, exchange rate exposure is expected to be related to international trade. However, 
based on data from eight countries, Dominguez and Tesar (2001 b,c), for instance, con-
clude that they do not find a strong connection between trade and exposure. Recent 
studies discuss possible reasons for this lack of significance, as there are, for instance, 
time-varying risks (De Santis and Gerard 1998, Tai 2000), hedging activities (Allayannis 
and Ofek 2001, Crabb 2002), neglected issues of competitiveness within industrial sec-
tors (Marston 2001), potential nonlinearities (Bartram 2002) or asymmetric exposure 
(Koutmos and Martin 2003). 
This study takes a fresh look at the subject using German data. Due to its high interna-
tional dependency, Germany is very well suited for testing the existence of exchange 
rate exposure. Our approach extends the literature in several ways. The usual way of 
measuring “residual” exchange rate exposure is choosing a CAPM specification aug-
mented by exchange rate risk. We deviate from this tradition by controlling for other ad-
ditional potential macroeconomic risks such as inflation and interest rate fluctuations as 
well, i.e. we follow multifactor-modelling in the spirit of Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
instead of augmented CAPM, thus avoiding some omitted variable bias. We argue that 
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macroeconomic shocks such as divergent monetary and fiscal policies, as well as asyn-
chronous output movements might drive stock returns and exchange rates in multidi-
mensional ways such that any prediction of the prevailing impact of exchange rates on 
stock returns is regime-dependent (see Gavin, 1989). Following further along these 
lines, we take account of time-dependency risks by running moving-window regres-
sions. In order to exploit the longitudinal information within the data of German DAX 
corporations used, we propose to apply rolling-panel estimation techniques.  
The role of second or higher moments caused by exchange rate adjustment costs, al-
though at the heart of uncertainty caused by exchange rate fluctuations, has received 
surprisingly little attention in the literature (remarkable exceptions being Miller and 
Reuter 1998, Andren 2001, Bartram 2002, and Priestley and Odegaard, 2002). Theo-
retical analysis reveals that profits and firm values are a convex function of the ex-
change rate (see Franke 1991, Sercu and Vanhulle 1992, and DeGrauwe 1994, among 
others). Several recent research articles have been motivated by the fact that a high 
percentage of firms use hedging strategies (see Bodnar and Gebhard 1998, and Bar-
tram et al., 2003, for surveys) to circumvent such costs of adjustment, and focus on 
hedging and reduced risk stemming from the use of forward contracts, options or other 
hedging strategies. The great bulk of research, however, neglects that there might be 
substantial costs of hedging, and that hedging costs depend on the exchange rate itself 
(see Dufey and Giddy, 2003, for strategies of managing corporate foreign exchange risk 
and related costs). The price of an option, for instance, increases convexly with the ex-
pectation for a currency’s volatility because of inherent leverage effects: the more vola-
tile, the higher the price. Our paper takes account of exchange rate adjustment costs by 
modelling exposure in dependence of exchange rate variation. Grounded on theoretical 
arguments (see Franke 1991, for instance) and empirical evidence (see Engel and 
Hamilton, 1990, and succeeding research), both stressing the importance of mean-
reverting exchange rates, we analyse the impact of substantial current deviations from 
expected long-run benchmarks.  
We estimate exchange rate exposure and test our hypotheses using performance indi-
ces from the German DAX corporations of the time 1977 to 1995, which was a period 
without adjustment processes following the breakdown of the Bretton Wood system in 
1973 (Bartov et al. 1996), and without anticipatory distortions in the face of the forth-
coming introduction of the euro in 1999.   
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Our primary intention is to derive conclusions with respect to aggregate exchange rate 
exposure of the German economy. We thus focus on a macroeconomic (macrofinancial) 
point of view, although we draw our conclusions on returns observed for individual stock 
companies. We find a rather unstable exposure of German stock market companies. In 
general (on average), German exposure is well described through the role of a net ex-
porter, who benefits from the depreciation of domestic currency. Accordingly, estima-
tions of time-varying exposure based on DM/US-dollar risks have a positive sign with 
the exception of the first half of the 1980ies, when a relatively high import dependency 
and a strong US dollar changed the situation. Persistent deviations of exchange rates 
from their long-run values have a significant impact on exposure. We find that the larger 
the distance of current exchange rates from their long-median is, the lower company 
values are. Moreover, there is evidence that impact curves are nonlinear and asymmet-
ric. Results are in accordance with long-run mean (median) reversion and asymmetric 
adjustment costs. 
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present previous research. Section 
3 describes our econometric specification, and in Section 4 we introduce the data sets 
employed. Section 5 informs about estimation results, and in Section 6 results are 
briefly summarized.   
 
2. Previous Research 
Most studies have been of limited success in identifying foreign currency exposure. 
Jorion (1990) analysed the exposure to exchange rates of 287 U.S. multinationals and 
found that only 15 of them are significantly affected by exchange rates. Bodnar and 
Gentry (1993), who provided evidence based on industry data for Canada, Japan and 
the U.S, reported that between 20 and 35 percent of industries have statistically signifi-
cant exchange rate exposures. He and Ng (1998) investigated the exchange rate expo-
sure of Japanese corporations and found that for the period 1979 to December 1993, 
only 25 percent of the 171 Japanese multinationals have significant exposure. 
Dominguez and Tesar (2001) examine the extent of firm and industry-level exposure in 
a sample of industrialized and developing countries for the period 1980-1999. In the 
pooled eight-country sample, they found that 23 percent of firms and 40 percent of in-
dustries are exposed to at least one of their indicators of exchange rate exposure (US 
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dollar, trade-weighted exchange rate, currency of the country’s major trading partner). 
Koutmos and Martin (2003) analysed exchange rate exposure in nine aggregate sectors 
of major economies (Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and 
confirmed existence of exposure in approximately 40 percent of the country-sector 
models.  
Many recent empirical studies focus their research on factors that determine the extent 
of exposure. An evident question is whether exchange rate exposure is influenced 
through the channel of international trade. Previous research in this area was pioneered 
by Jorion (1990), who showed that a firm’s exchange rate exposure is positively related 
to the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. This result was extended and confirmed by 
recent work of He and Ng (1978), Dominguez and Tesar (2001), and Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001), inter alia. He and Ng (1998) showed that Japanese multinationals with 
higher exposure levels are related to higher export shares. However, looking at interna-
tional evidence, Dominguez and Tesar (2001b,c) concluded that they did not find a 
strong connection between trade and exposure, although there seems to be some evi-
dence that a higher level of foreign sales corresponds to higher exposure for Germany 
(Dominguez and Tesar, 2001c, Table 10).  Marston (2001) has drawn attention to the 
fact that even a local firm which neither exports nor imports can be exposed to changes 
in exchange rates, for instance if it competes with foreign firms in the domestic market. 
Thus, as is known from the related literature on exchange-rate pass-through, an impor-
tant determinant is the competitive structure of the industry in which a firm operates. 
Some studies have shown that the use of foreign currency derivatives (FCDs), i.e. a 
short-term (less than one year) hedging strategy, is related to exchange rate exposure. 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) found that the use of FCDs is negatively related to the abso-
lute value of foreign currency exposure. By controlling for hedging activity, Crabb (2002) 
provided evidence that previous studies often found insignificant effects because hedg-
ing mitigated currency risks. Exchange rate exposure seems to be higher when compa-
nies operate within a system of liberalized exchange rates. Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul 
(1996) consider the switch from fixed to floating exchange rates following the break-
down of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 and found increasing risks thereafter, 
whereas Bartram and Karolyi (2003) showed that the introduction of the euro in 1999 
was accompanied by significant reductions in market risk exposures in and outside of 
Europe.   
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Due to its high share of sales going to exports and its high share of imported goods, 
Germany is very well suited for testing exchange rate exposure. Indeed, Bartram 
(2002), who argued that exchange rate exposure may be partly nonlinear, identified 
both linear and nonlinear exposure components using data of 447 German corpora-
tions. However, at the sector level, Koutmos and Martin (2003) found significant ex-
change rate exposure for only one out of nine sectors in Germany. Based on returns of 
12 sector indexes, Entorf and Kabbalakes (1998) detected significant (positive) expo-
sure for chemicals, motor cars and machinery, steel production, and holdings, suggest-
ing that exposure in Germany is mainly driven by exporting activities1. Glaum et. al 
(2000) showed that total exchange rate exposure is unstable over time. Entorf (2000) 
estimated a time-varying measure of overall German currency risk and showed that it 
significantly depends both on German exports and imports.  
 
3. Econometric specification: Orthogonalization issues, APT versus 
augmented CAPM, and time-varying measurement 
As in most studies measuring exchange rate exposure, we follow Adler and Dumas 
(1984) who showed that the extent of corporate exposure boils down to the slope pa-
rameter ib  of a regression  
(1)     i i i ir a b d ε= + +    
where ri is the stock market return of company i, i = 1,2,…N, and d is the return of the 
exchange rate. Most previous econometric studies further control for overall market risk 
mr  leading to a CAPM specification augmented by exchange rate movements, 
(2)      it i i t i mt itr a b d rγ ε= + + + , 
based on time series observations. The “conditional” or “residual” effect (as it was called 
by Bodnar and Wong, 2000), i.e. the exposure that is different from general market ex-
posure, measured by ib  in equation (2), is then interpreted as “residual” exchange rate 
                                            
1 Entorf and Kabbalakes (1998) estimated the extent of “total” exchange rate exposure by regressing 
foreign exchange rates on stock returns without controlling for general market risks, whereas Koutmos 
and Martin (2003) estimated the “residual” effect by including the overall market factor. 
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exposure, whereas the slope parameter in equation (1) would imply some measure of 
“total” exposure (Bodnar and Wong, 2000) that might be disturbed by some spurious 
effects arising when common market factors drive both exchange rates and (all) stock 
returns simultaneously (due to unanticipated monetary shocks, for instance). 
Sensitivity of individual firm values to overall market risk (i.e. the “beta” of a firm in the 
context of non-augmented CAPM modelling) is covered by iγ . A problem with specifica-
tion (2) is that overall market exposure mr , which in empirical studies is represented by 
broad market indices such as the DAX, includes several driving factors, of which ex-
change rate risk may be particularly important. Thus, insignificance of previous results 
might arise from the fact that currency risks were already included in overall risk and 
priced in market risk factors, leading to the misleading statistical result that collinearity 
between market portfolios and exchange rates prevents significant results. To circum-
vent a problem such as this, we apply a strategy well known from testing Arbitrage Pric-
ing Theory (APT). McElroy and Burmeister (1988) introduced the use of the so-called 
“residual market factor” which implies orthogonalization of overall market risk and other 
risk factors which only consist of exchange rates in the present case of augmented 
CAPM. Thus, we first estimate an auxiliary regression to capture that particular fraction 
of aggregate market risk which was induced by exchange rate fluctuations: 
(3)      mt t mtr a b d r= + +  
The residual of the regression, mtr , represents the residual market factor, i.e. the overall 
market risk corrected for the influence of exchange rates. Inserting mtr  from equation (3) 
into equation (2) gives  
(4)      it i i t i mt itr d rα β γ ε= + + + , 
where i i ia aα γ= +  and i i ib bβ γ= + . Thus, iβ  summarizes direct and indirect compo-
nents of exchange rate exposure, whereas the coefficient iγ on mtr remains the same as 
on mtr  in equation (2).  
One may argue that it is precisely the incremental effect of exchange rate movements 
not covered by market risk, i.e. of ib  in equation (2), which is of particular interest here, 
because it represents the firm-specific component of exchange rate exposure. However, 
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a firm should be interested in hedging the risk of total potential value changes resulting 
from exchange rate changes, irrespective of whether these changes affect the common 
risk of all firms or the risk of the individual firm only. After all, in our study we are, by way 
of aggregating individual data, primarily interested in exchange exposure faced by the 
German economy as a whole, not in marginal exposure of particular firms. From these 
points of view, exposing the relevant currency risk by way of orthogonalization seems to 
be an adequate strategy which has been followed by some authors before.2   
Augmented CAPM specification of exposure estimation regression overlooks the fact 
that further macroeconomic factors besides exchange rates can influence individual re-
turns. For instance, a depreciation might be related to some expansionary monetary 
policy that simultaneously could have a positive impact on economic activity of domestic 
firms (Dornbusch, 1976). From the more general viewpoint of financial and macroeco-
nomic theory, Gavin (1989) provided a framework that shows how exchange rates and 
stock returns interact, and how they react to changes in interest rates, output, and, in 
particular, to anticipated and unanticipated changes of monetary and fiscal policy (see 
also Blanchard, 1981, for a related work).3 From the viewpoint of financial economics, a 
                                            
2 However, there seems to be some confusion as to what kind of orthogonalization should be used in 
econometric tests of the Adler-Dumas framework. Most applications we am aware of proceed in the man-
ner described above (Doukas et al. 1999, Allayannis and Ofek, 2001, Griffin and Stulz, 2001, Bris et al. 
2002, Priestley and Odegaard, 2002, among others), whereas Jorion (1991) proposed to orthogonalize 
exchange rates, i.e. he employed the reverse regression by regressing exchange rates on market portfo-
lios, and he used the residual from this regression as orthogonalized exchange rates which he included in 
the exposure regression in addition to total market risk. This approach is counterintuitive and does not 
coincide with the usual way of orthogonalization known from multi-factor APT modelling. It is also mis-
leading as it does not solve the problem of “hidden” exposure covered and priced in overall market risk. 
The estimated parameter on orthogonalized exchange rates, i.e. estimated exposure, is even identical to 
estimated exposure of unorthogonalized exchange rates of equation (2) in reversed regressions, whereas 
the coefficient of market risk would change its value (see (4) and substitute variables accordingly). Moti-
vated by related work of Choi and Prasad (1995), Glaum et al. (2000) followed the way described in 
Jorion (1991). Not surprisingly, they did not find any significant “residual” exposure for German data.  
From this, they erroneously draw the conclusion that estimating “total” exchange rate exposure (in the 
sense of equation (1)) would be a better way of proceeding.  
3 It should be noted, however, that there are good reasons for neglecting potential problems of endogene-
ity in our specification, since left-hand side variables, i.e. corporate returns, are observed at the individual 
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well known strategy for using controls for such disturbing macroeconomic influences is 
the application of “Arbitrage Pricing Theory” (APT), pioneered by Ross (1976), and al-
ready introduced by Jorion (1991) to the literature on exchange exposure.4 In our 
econometric model, we apply the multi-factor equation of the APT model5, according to 
which the variation of stock returns is explained by a K-factor model of the form 
Kr Bfµ ε= + + , where r  is  the vector of returns in N stock prices, and Kf  is a vector of 
K (unanticipated) factors, of which only the (residual) market factor and exchange-rate 
fluctuations were used in previous augmented CAPM specifications of the exposure 
regressions.6 B  is a NxK matrix of factor sensitivities to the K factors.  
There is no general rule for selecting relevant macroeconomic risk factors. According to 
the “discounted cash flow model”, which assumes that prices of assets are determined 
through their expected discounted dividend payments, factors have to be selected that 
are potentially responsible for the determination of these payments. Inspired by factors 
proposed by Chen et al. (1986), who pioneered the empirical approach of estimating the 
APT, we include a survey indicator of the German business climate, the inflation rate, 
the term structure, a (residual) market factor, and, in particular, the US dollar, represent-
ing the most important source of German exchange rate risk. Since only unexpected 
components of macroeconomic time series can influence asset returns in efficient capi-
tal markets, we calculate unexpected variation of all variables applying ARMA- and 
ARIMA-filtering techniques. In order to capture the (residual) market risk that is not ex-
                                                                                                                                             
level, whereas explanatory variables such as exchange rate fluctuations or trade are given at the aggre-
gate level, which is exogenous to each individual firm.   
4 The reason why this idea was widely neglected in later work might be that he used orthogonalized ex-
change rates (instead of orthogonalized market factor) such that significance was low and suffered from 
multicollinearity. 
5 We do not present estimations of a full APT model in this paper, because our focus is on time-variant 
rolling window regressions based on panel information. A complete model consists of the joint determina-
tion of factor sensitivities within the multi-factor model and of risk premia, which reveal whether investors 
have to be compensated by a higher expected return because the exchange rate risk or other risks are 
not diversifiable. Nonlinear seemingly unrelated regressions of the complete model have been performed 
in Jamin (1999) and Entorf and Jamin (2000). 
6 Note that due to the orthogonalization of the residual market factor and macroeconomic factors, CAPM 
boils down to be a simple parametric restriction of Arbitrage Pricing Theory. 
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plained by other systematic risk factors, we follow the procedure suggested by McElroy 
and Burmeister (1988) described above. Therefore we include the residual market fac-
tor that is represented by the residual of an OLS-regression of the market return on the 
unexpected components of macroeconomic variables (which is a generalization of 
equation (3)). Now equation (4) can be extended to the specification of an APT expo-
sure regression which looks as follows: 
(5)      uit i i t i mt i t itr d r fα β γ δ ε= + + + + , 
where f represents a vector of macroeconomic variables, and the superscript u denotes 
unexpected components.7  
We extend previous approaches by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of com-
pany firm values using fixed company effects8 which might arise due to particular fea-
tures not observable in the data (management, reputation, etc.). With individual DAX 
companies available, we stack individual time series and run each of presented specifi-
cations (1), (2), (4) and (5) as systems of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). SUR 
considers correlations of disturbances across companies and leads to GLS estimation 
of the whole system. Stacking companies allows several tests as well as estimation of 
aggregate exposure: 1) is iα α=  for every company i  (test for unobserved heterogene-
ity))? , 2) the testable restriction iβ β=  for every i  gives an estimate of aggregate stock 
market exposure, 3) if the restriction iγ γ=  holds, then the universe of all German DAX 
companies would share a common overall market risk, and 4) if 0iδ =  for every i ,  then 
APT could be restricted to augmented CAPM.  
Even after controlling for macroeconomic risks, unobservable macroeconomic and fi-
nancial changes may result in unstable currency exposure. Moreover, exposure reflects 
expectations of investors which do not depend on the whole history of financial markets, 
                                            
7 Not surprisingly, testing ARIMA models for the DM/dollar rate as well as for market risk factors has led 
to the conclusion that their (short-term) time series behaviour is well described by a random walk. Thus, 
we treat returns of the DM/dollar rate and of the market factors as unexpected components. Note missing 
superscripts in equation (5).  
8 We do not test for random effects because our primary goal is to achieve consistent results of the expo-
sure parameters needed in the second stage of the estimation procedure (to be discussed below).  
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but rather on limited information sets. Thus, estimations should be time-varying, and 
they should give much more weight on recent observations. Accordingly, we estimate 
equation (5) using moving window regressions, with each additional rolling sample giv-
ing a new estimate itβ . 9 
Most applications of exchange rate exposure models are based on two-stage proce-
dures, pioneered by the work of Jorion (1990). In the standard first stage, by running N 
time series regressions, the stock returns of a sample of N companies are regressed on 
the exchange rate within an augmented CAPM discussed above (see equation (2)). 
Second-stage specifications then consist of regressing exchange rate exposure ib  on 
indicators of foreign involvement, or other determinants of exposure discussed above. 
We extend this procedure by performing moving APT multifactor models, thereby em-
ploying panel information of company returns. Disposing of resulting time-varying expo-
sures 
it
β  (instead of iβ  or ib ) in second-stage regressions allows us to focus on panel 
data and time series instead of cross sections to analyse the (macro-) economic deter-
minants of exchange rate exposure. 
 
4. Data  
Our sample of stocks includes 28 leading German corporations comprising the DAX 
(the leading index of the Frankfurt stock exchange) on the 31st of March 1995.10 They 
represent about 70 % of total turnover in German stocks during the sample period.11 
Monthly returns for the period from January 1977 through March 1995 are adjusted for 
dividends, capital increases and splits according to adjustment factors obtained from 
                                            
9 As only unanticipated realizations enter the APT multifactor model, unexpected components of all ex-
planatory variables are calculated using residuals from ARIMA models for each rolling sample.   
10 In order to take advantage of a balanced panel, VIAG and Henkel had to be excluded as their returns 
were not available for the whole estimation period. 
11 See Sauer, A. (1994), p. 102. 
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KKMDB, i.e the “Karlsruhe Data Base for Financial Time Series” (“Karlsruher Kapital-
marktdatenbank”).12 
Macroeconomic risks are based on the following variables:  
• Business climate: Monthly change rate of the “ifo business climate” (“ifo-
Geschaeftsklimaindex”), an acknowledged German leading business cycle indicator 
published by CESifo (Munich). 
• Inflation: Monthly rate of change in the German consumer price index (“Lebenshal-
tungskostenindex”) calculated by the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches 
Bundesamt). 
• Term structure: Difference between the 10-year rate on German government bonds 
and the 1-month money market rate, both calculated by Deutsche Bundesbank 
(Frankfurt). 
• Exchange rate: We use closing prices of the “Deutsche Mark (DM)/ US dollar” ex-
change rate at the Frankfurt foreign exchange market. As our objective is to examine 
the particular importance of the US dollar for German stock companies, we refrain 
from using trade-weighted averages of different currencies, as was proposed by 
Jorion (1990, 1991), and applied by Bodnar and Gentry (1993) and others.13  
                                            
12 KKMDB was supported by the German National Science Foundation (DFG, Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft) to provide a file of German stock prices and performance indices for scientific use. For further 
information see http://finance.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de/Forschung/kkmdb.html.  
13 The use of trade-weighted indices was proposed by Jorion (1990, 1991) who analysed US exposure. In 
the US, however, there is no single currency which is as important as the US dollar for German or Euro-
pean economies. In Germany, the US dollar clearly is the centre of investors’ attention, as can be seen 
from perpetual and recurrent comments in newspapers, even very recently, i.e. at a time when a majority 
of German contracts are factorized in domestic currency, i.e. in euro: “Up or down, euro leaves exporters 
complaining” (International Herald Tribune, May 9, 2003), “Anleger verkaufen Exportwerte. Aufwertung 
von Yen und Euro trüben Gewinnaussichten japanischer und europäischer Firmen”  (“Investors sell sha-
res of export-oriented companies. Appreciation of yen and euro obscure expected profit of Japanese and 
European firms”  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 23, 2003). From this quotations, note the 
relevance of US dollars as ”euro“ always refers to US-dollar/euro. Moreover, note the high relevance of 
the DM/dollar rate for the euro, as it was the key currency in Europe, and its share amounted to 33.07 
percent (second largest share: French Franc, 20.28 percent) of the basket of currencies constituting the 
ecu, i.e. the “synthetic” currency preceding the euro.  
  
13
The overall German market risk is based on the DAFOX (“Deutscher Aktien-
Forschungs-Index”), which is a Laspeyres performance index including all 30 DAX cor-
porations as a subset (see Göppl and Schütz, 1993, for details). It was generated for 
scientific research purposes in order to dispose of a broader index of overall German 
stock market portfolio than the one provided by the DAX, which only consists of German 
blue chips (source: KKMDB).   
Indicators of foreign involvement are available as shares of exported and imported 
goods and services in German GDP (West Germany, source: Statistisches Bundesamt). 
This allows us to consider the burden of (imported) input costs as well, an issue that is 
often neglected in empirical studies which mainly limit their focus to foreign sales. 
 
5. Results  
5.1. Direction and Magnitude of Exposure 
We compare exposure estimates of augmented CAPM and APT-based models for dif-
ferent periods of time in Tables 1 to 3. Our sample consists of monthly returns of 28 
DAX companies for the time period January 1977 to March 1995, leading to 6132 ob-
servations. The sample period lies well beyond the beginning of floating exchange rates 
in 1973 and well ahead the introduction of the euro in 1999. This selection avoids poten-
tially misleading results due to adjustment problems after the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system described by Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul (1996), or because of anticipating 
investment decisions in the face of a forthcoming introduction of the euro (see Bartram 
and Karolyi, 2003).   
In Table 1, column (1), estimates of the augmented CAPM reveal that company-specific 
effects turn out to be insignificant. Evidently, observed heterogeneity measured by com-
pany-specific exposure itb  and company-specific influences from market factors render 
control for unobserved heterogeneity meaningless. All company estimates of exchange 
rate exposure have a positive sign, and 12 of them are significant. As regards market 
betas, individual estimates of overall market influences range between 0.79 (RWE, a 
former energy utility) and 1.32 (Daimler, car production).  
In Table 1, column (2), we test for common exposure, identical to all DAX companies. 
This hypothesis is not rejected. Exposure is highly significant and estimated to be 0.172. 
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Thus, for the period 1977 to 1995, an increase of the DM/US dollar-exchange rate by 10 
percent (i.e. a depreciation of domestic, i.e. German, currency) on average increased 
stock market values of German companies by 1.7 percent.  
Table 1, column (3), additionally restricts individual coefficients of overall market portfo-
lio risk to be identical for all companies. The aggregate estimate is 1.072, indicating 
overall offensive behaviour of German DAX companies in the long run. However, testing 
the restriction shows that the hypothesis of a common parameter has to be rejected 
(see footnote of Table 1 for details of hypothesis testing). The estimate of exchange rate 
exposure remains almost unchanged (0.168 instead of 0.172). 
Finally, specification (2) is replicated using the overall market factor mr instead of the 
residual market factor mr . Indeed, for reasons discussed in Section 3, using this specifi-
cation leads to insignificance of exchange rate exposure. Thus, we can conclude that 
exchange rate exposure is an important determinant of German stock values, but that it 
would not show up in standard residual exposure models based on overall market risk. 
General market risk presumably has more than one dimension. Table 2 controls for fur-
ther macroeconomic factors within the framework of an APT-based multifactor model. 
Table 2, column (1), presents unrestricted14 estimates. At a first glance, results do not 
differ much from corresponding column (1) of Table 1: Now 26 out of 28 company expo-
sures have a positive sign (and 8 of them are significant instead of 12 in Table 1), and 
the range of market betas is almost the same as before (ranging between RWE’s 0.79 
and Daimler’s 1.34).15 However, inspecting column (2) shows that the aggregate esti-
mate of exchange rate exposure is only 0.139 (instead of 0.172), indicating some omit-
ted variable bias of the augmented CAPM specification, i.e. when other macroeconomic 
factors were ignored.16 
                                            
14 As before, tests show insignificance of company-specific fixed effects. 
15 Company-specific exposures and sensitivities to overall market factors are presented in Tables C,D of 
the Appendix.  
16 The bias will be become more conclusive when different estimation periods are considered (see Table 
3 discussed below).  
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Table 2, column (3), shows that sensitivity to overall market risk remains almost un-
changed compared to CAPM in Table 1. In column (4), company-specific sensitivities to 
other macroeconomic factors are restricted to be identical to some aggregate estimate. 
Estimated parameters are highly significant, indicating that restricting APT to CAPM 
would not be justified by the data. Directions of influence are in line with usual economic 
reasoning. First, (non-anticipated) inflation has a negative impact on stock market re-
turns. This might imply that investors expect a negative impact of increasing money de-
preciation on company profits. The negative parameter of changes of the term structure 
is in line with the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure, as an increase 
in the term structure implies the expectation of increasing future interest rates, and 
therefore a heavier discounting of future profits. The parameter estimate of the ifo busi-
ness climate indicator has a positive sign, confirming its role as acknowledged leading 
economic indicator for German companies.  
Table 3 reveals that exchange rate exposure is not stable over time. To show changing 
parameter estimates, we divide our sample into four different, rather heterogeneous 
subperiods. The situation of the first period, 1977 to 1979, is characterized by a well 
performing German economy and appreciation of the Deutsche Mark. The DM/dollar-
exchange rate fell from 2.40 at the beginning of 1977 to 1.70 in December 1979. The 
next six years, 1980 to 1985, are predominated by the second oil price shock and the 
recession in 1981/82, and a sustainable depreciation of the Deutsche Mark against the 
dollar, reaching its peak in March 1985, when the DM/dollar rate was 3.36. After the so-
called Plaza Agreement reached in September 1985 by the G-5 countries (France, Ja-
pan, West Germany,  the UK and US), on a need to adjust current exchange, the time 
span 1986 to 1990 was characterised by a now strongly depreciating dollar. The 
DM/dollar rate fell to 1.50 at the end of 1990. The final period, 1991 to 1995, includes  
the time after German unification with a relatively stable but low DM/dollar rate (fluctuat-
ing around 1.60, maximum: 1.82, minimum: 1.37). 
Table 3 shows aggregate exposure17 to DM/dollar movements estimated from statisti-
cally preferred specifications of previous tables, i.e. along column (2) of Tables 1 and 2. 
For reasons of comparison, we also include measurements of total exposure based on 
                                            
17 Company-specific estimates are presented in Tables C,D (Appendix). 
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bivariate regression (1). Looking at APT-based specifications, estimated exposure var-
ied intensely from -0.308 in 1980/1985 to 0.447 during the time period 1991 to1995. The 
estimate of the period 1980 to 1985, i.e. the period of a very strong dollar and deep re-
cession, was the only period with a negative exposure. The estimate (–0.308) indicates 
that a 10 percent increase of the DM/dollar exchange rate has led to a 3.1 percent fall of 
DAX stock returns. Thus, it seems as if further depreciation of the Deutsche Mark 
against the US dollar shied away investors during the space of 1980 and 1985, whereas 
other analogous times of a relatively strong dollar (or weak DM) had stimulating effects 
on the German economy.  
 
Table 1: Estimation of exposure using augmented CAPM, 1977-1995 
Model: it i i t i mt itr d rα β γ ε= + + +  
Para-
meter 
(1) (2) (3) (2’) 
 Test of common alpha1) Test of common ex-
posure2)    
Test of common market 
risk3) 
Use of mr  in-
stead  of mr  
α      0.0081** 
  (0.0005) 
α α=" "i  not rejected 
 
  0.0081** 
(0.0005) 
     0.0081** 
 (0.0005) 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
β  number of companies with 
positive exposure: 28 
(significant: 12), 
number of companies with 
negative exposure: 0 
 
0.172** 
 (0.014) 
β β=" "i  not re-
jected 
   0.168** 
 (0.014) 
  - 0.002 
     (0.014) 
γ  company specific, range:  
0.79 (RWE)  - 1.32 (Daim-
ler) 
company specific, 
range:  
0.79 (RWE)  - 1.32 
(Daimler) 
  1.071** 
 (0.010) 
γ γ=" "i  rejected 
 
company spe-
cific, range:  
0.79 (RWE) - 
1.32 (Daimler) 
2R  0.529 0.529 0.519 0.529 
Notes: Sample: 28 DAX companies, 1977:01-1995:03, (6132 observations). See the text for estimation 
details. **) denotes significance at 1 percent level. Restrictions are tested using F-Tests: 1) test for unob-
served company effects, 2) (2) is tested against (1), 3) (3) is tested against (2). Corresponding F-
statistics: 1) F= 0.79, 2) F=1.10, 3) F= 5.36. Critical values: F(27,∞ , 5%) =1.46,  F(27, ∞ , 1%) = 1.69.
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Table 2: Estimation of exposure using APT multifactor model, 1977-1995 
Model: α β γ δ δ δ ε= + + + + + +1 2 3u u uit i t i mt i t i t i t itr d r p i c   
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Test of common alpha1) Test of common exposure2)  Test of common market risk3) Full restriction4) 
α      0.0083** 
 (0.0005) 
α α=" "i  not rejected 
 
  0.0083** 
(0.0005) 
   0.0083** 
 (0.0005) 
  0.0083** 
(0.0005) 
β  number of companies with positive 
exposure: 26 
(significant: 8) 
 number of companies with (insig-
nificant) negative exposure: 2  
 
  0.139** 
 (0.014) 
 
β β=" "i  not rejected 
   0.136** 
  (0.014) 
0.135** 
 (0.014) 
γ  company specific, range:  
0.79 (RWE)  -  1.34 (Daimler) 
company specific, range:  
0.79 (RWE)  -  1.34 (Daimler) 
  1.072** 
  (0.010) 
γ γ=" "i  rejected 
  1.073** 
(0.010) 
δ δ δ1 2 3, ,  company specific company specific company specific δ δ= − = −1 2ˆ ˆ2.06 * *, 1.78 * *  
δ =
3ˆ
0.33 * *  
2R  0.531 0.531 0.522 0.519 
Notes: 28 DAX companies, 1977:01-1995:03 (6132 observations). See the text for estimation details. **) denotes significance at 1 percent. Restrictions are tested 
using F-Tests: 1) test for unobserved company effects, 2) (2) is tested against (1), 3) (3) is tested against (2), 4) (4) is tested against (3). Estimated F-statistics: 1) F= 
0.76, 2) F=1.21, 3) F= 5.07, 4) F=1.39. Critical values 1)-3) F(27, ∞ , 5%) = 1.46, F(27, ∞ , 1%) = 1.69, specification (4): (F(91,∞ , 5%) = 1.27. 
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Table 3: Comparison of exposure models for different sample periods 
 
Estimates of exchange rate exposure 
Model 1977-1995 1977-1979 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 
Total exposure1)  0.075 
 (0.078) 
 
0.114* 
(0.047) 
 - 0.180* 
  (0.084) 
   0.401** 
 (0.143) 
  0.224* 
 (0.097) 
Residual expo-
sure: 
? Augmented    
CAPM2) 
 
    
 
 
 
0.172** 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.027 
(0.016) 
 
 
 
 
- 0.268** 
(0.017) 
 
 
 
   
0.526** 
 (0.017) 
 
 
 
 
  0.263** 
(0.020) 
? APT-based3)   0.139** 
(0.014) 
  0.057** 
(0.006) 
- 0.308** 
(0.017) 
 
  0.296** 
 (0.016) 
  0.447** 
(0.021) 
  Notes: Estimation models: 1) Based on equation (1), 2) based on equation (4), restriction as Table 1, col. (2), 3) based  
  on equation (5), restriction as Table 2, col. (2). *), **) denote significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 3 allows us to compare “total” exposure with “residual” exposure either from multi-
factor specifications or from augmented CAPM modelling. As macroeconomic factors are 
significantly different from zero in specification (5), we may conclude that estimates both 
for total exposure and for estimates based on augmented CAPM suffer from omitted vari-
able biases. The bias can be substantial, as can be seen, for instance, from the time pe-
riod 1980 - 1985, when total exposure was -0.18, whereas multi-factor exposure was         
-0.31, or from the period 1986 - 1990, when exposure from augmented CAPM was 0.53, 
whereas the APT-based estimate amounts to 0.30.  
Figure 1 displays aggregate time-varying exposures from moving window regressions. The 
specification is based on equation (5), where company-specific exposures and company-
specific macroeconomic effects are restricted to be identical to corresponding aggregate 
parameters (as presented in Table 2, column (4)). These estimates do not differ signifi-
cantly from statistically superior results without such a restriction (compare columns (2) 
and (4) of Table 3).18 Rolling samples cover a time span of 48 months. Estimated expo-
sures of each rolling regression period are displayed at the month of the midterm period. 
Thus, the first observation in Figure 1 presented for December 1978 represents estimated 
exposure of the estimation period 1977:01 – 1980:12, the last observation dated March 
1993 covers the period 1991:04 – 1995:03 (note that this last period almost coincides with 
the last period analysed in Table 3). Figure 1 illustrates previous estimates from Table 3 in 
more detail. The graph nicely exhibits the time-varying nature of the German “dance with 
the dollar” which implies, for instance, that an appreciating dollar (relative to Deutsche 
Mark) temporarily entails decreasing company returns (as in 1980 to 1985), and at other 
times implied increasing values of German companies. A noticeable drop of exchange rate 
exposure not detectable in estimations of longer time periods happened around 1990, i.e. 
the time of the fall of the Iron Curtain.  
Before we analyse the determinants for the time-varying exposure in more detail, we may 
conclude that the assumption of a stable currency exposure is not justified.19 This result 
                                            
18 Attempts to estimate individual parameters for each company and for each rolling sample turned out to be 
unfeasible due to convergence problems of sample-specific ARIMA modelling and singularity problems.  
19 This finding confirms previous results based on total exposure put forward independently of each other by 
Glaum et al. (1990) and Entorf (2000). The general time pattern of exposure presented there roughly coin-
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does not necessarily come as a surprise, as currency exposure interacts with overall mar-
ket portfolio in augmented CAPM or APT-based specifications of which we already know 
the stylised fact that market betas (i.e. γ  in our notation) are not stable over time.20  
 
Figure 1: Time-varying exchange rate exposure in Germany 
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 Note: Estimates are based on moving window regressions of APT-multifactor specifications,  
 see equation (5) and Tables 2, 3. See the text for estimation details. 
                                                                                                                                                 
cides with the one presented in Figure 1, but levels differ and curves appear to be more erratic when they 
are based on total exposure.  
20 Early evidence on beta-instability dates from the 1970s (see, for instance, Blume 1975). More recent evi-
dence using more sophisticated tests is reported in, e.g., Bos and Newbold (1984) and Gonzales-Rivera 
(1997). See Table D (Appendix) for company-specific variations in our sample. 
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5.2. Determinants of Exposure 
Costs and benefits of a weakening dollar differ between firms. Exporters like car producers 
suffer from appreciation of domestic currency relative to the dollar, whereas companies 
which ground their production on a high share of inputs factorized in US dollars (like en-
ergy utilities) would realize unexpected windfall profits. Studies analysing determinants of 
exposure, in particular when they are based on data at the company level, focus on foreign 
sales but often ignore exchange-rate dependent costs from importing inputs. As we are 
interested in estimating and analysing the aggregate role of exposure in Germany, we use 
both export shares and import shares of (West) German GDP in order to analyse the dual 
and ambivalent role of exchange rate movements for the German economy. From the 
viewpoint of a representative firm operating in a world-wide economy, we expect that in 
situations dominated by the interests of foreign sales (German exporters), there will be a 
positive impact from depreciation of the domestic (German) currency on the firm value, 
whereas the opposite would apply in situations which are characterized by a relative 
strong dependency on the costs coming from imports. Thus, we expect exposure to have a 
positive sign in situations of dominating exports, and to be negative during periods of rela-
tively high imports. As Germany for the most part had a surplus in its trade balance, it is 
well described by the situation of a net exporter, and we expect a positive sign for exports 
and a negative sign for imports in second-stage regressions devoted to the analysis of de-
terminants of exposure. 
Firm values are affected by costs of adjustment. The role of adjustment costs caused by 
the order of magnitude of exchange rate movements has received surprisingly little atten-
tion in the literature.21 Theoretical analysis shows that profits and firm values may be a 
                                            
21 Only a few articles test and estimate nonlinearities in exposure models. Whereas Miller and Reuer (1998) 
and Andren (2001) tested for exposure of quadratic and cubic macro-price changes with insignificant or weak 
results, Bartram (2002) performed several tests for nonlinearities with and without structure and confirmed 
the need to model nonlinear exposure by referring to significance of cubic terms. Results by Priestley and 
Odegaard (2002) point to the conclusion that exporters are subject to nonlinear exposure but importers are 
not. Our testing strategy differs from that of quoted articles in various aspects and is based on different data 
sets. Closest to our approach, Miller and Reuer (1998), Andren (2001) and Koutmos and Martin (2003) focus 
on asymmetric adjustment to depreciations and appreciations, but performed one-stage estimations based 
on (linear) dichotomous indicators of asymmetry make it necessary to analyse 9 possible outcomes for ex-
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convex function of the exchange rate (see Franke 1991, Sercu and Vanhulle 1992, and 
DeGrauwe 1994, among others). Convexities can arise because of costly adjustments of 
international portfolios, or when volatile exchange rates affect uncertainty of future prices 
of exported or imported goods, among others. For instance, underestimating the risk of an 
exchange rate change might facilitate over-expansion of foreign indebtedness exposing 
firms to high costs when exchange rates do change. Moreover, marketing investments in 
foreign markets (German car producers in the US, for instance) and other entry costs 
might become sunk costs when a future appreciation of the domestic currency undermines 
the competitiveness of exporting corporations. Motivated by the fact that a high percentage 
of firms use hedging strategies to circumvent such costs of adjustment22, several recent 
papers focus on hedging and reduced risk stemming from the use of forward contracts, 
options or other hedging strategies, but they neglect to say that there might be substantial 
costs of hedging, and that the cost of hedging depends on the exchange rate itself (see 
Giddy and Dufey, 2003, for strategies of managing corporate foreign exchange risk and 
related costs). The price of an option, for instance, increases convexly with the expectation 
for a currency’s volatility because of inherent leverage effects: the more volatile, the higher 
the price.  
Our paper takes account of exchange rate adjustment costs by modelling exposure in de-
pendence of exchange rate variation. Moreover, in line with Franke (1991), who assumed 
the exchange rate to be mean reverting, and motivated by confirming empirical evidence 
found by Engel and Hamilton (1990), Frankel and Rose (1996), Sweeney (2001), inter alia, 
we test the hypothesis that firm values are influenced by the absolute distance of the ex-
                                                                                                                                                 
posure such that structural interpretations are difficult to derive. Koutmos and Martin (2003) also employed 
conditional heteroskedasticity of error terms of estimated sector stock market returns, but they do not con-
sider higher moments in their CAPM augmented market model.       
22 Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) report that in comparative samples of US and German firms, 78% of German 
firms compared to 57% of US firms make use of derivatives in risk management. More recently, Bartram et 
al. (2003) present international evidence on financial derivatives usage for a sample of 7,292 non-financial 
firms. Across all 410 German firms in the sample, there were only 44.9 percent using derivatives in general, 
while 36.8 percent use currency derivatives. Corresponding international numbers for all firms of the sample 
from 48 countries, 59.8% and 43.6%, respectively, show that such practices seem to be less widespread in 
Germany than elsewhere.  
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change rate from its long-run mean. More precisely, based on previous considerations on 
adjustment costs and convexities, we expect that a growing absolute distance between 
exchange rates (levels) and their expected long-run mean (or median) ( )t tD m D−  would 
lead to increasing costs and reduced corporate values, respectively. If this hypothesis is 
true, exchange rate exposure, which measures the extent of changed firm values with re-
spect to changes in exchange rates, should decrease with rising ( )t tD m D− , possibly in a 
non-linear functional form.  
Table 4 shows estimation results of the second-stage regressions. According to previous 
considerations, estimated exposures itβ  are regressed on aggregate export and import 
shares of GDP and on the relative distance between the dollar and its expected long-run 
value. 23 24 Corporate-specific fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity (man-
agement strategies such as individually different hedging practices, for instance).25 We 
stack individual time series and base second stage regressions on specification (6), i.e.  
(6)    0 1 2 ( ( ))it i i t i t i t t itexs ims f D m Dβ λ λ λ ε= + + + − + , 
                                            
23 Companies are exposed to exchange rate risk when itβ is different from zero. At first thought, it seems 
natural to use absolute exposures itβ  and regress them on potential explanatory factors of exposure. 
However, in order to interpret results in a meaningful way, it is necessary to analyse channels of influence of, 
for instance, increasing exports on company returns via the impact of itβ . As is obvious from Table 3, a 
higher itβ  does not automatically translate into higher company returns, as during 1980 - 1985 exposure was 
estimated to be negative. Thus, the sign of itβ  is likewise important. Using absolute values instead of un-
changed exposure would mask the possible result that during the period at the beginning of the 80ies some 
increasing export performance would have led to diminishing firm values, whereas in “normal” times (i.e. 
during all other time periods) German (average) company values would go up. Indeed, estimation results 
based on absolute values show switching signs for exports and imports during 1980 to 1985 (results avail-
able on request).   
24 Table 4 is based on quarterly observations. Data on volumes of exports and imports for the whole estima-
tion period are available only on a quarterly basis. Monthly observations on exposure and exchange rates 
are transformed to quarterly observations by merging last observations. Alternative frequency conversion by 
averaging monthly observations left parameter estimates almost unchanged.    
25 Company-specific effects are significant for all specifications presented in Table 4. 
  
24
which we use as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions, where exs and ims repre-
sent export share and import share, respectively. Individual itβ are obtained from moving-
window first-stage panel regressions which consider company-specific APT factors (see 
equation (5)). As exposures itβ  are estimated from moving windows, point estimates are 
allocated midway of each window, as displayed in Figure 1 (hence explanatory variables 
are matched to the same centre point of each window).  
Imposing the restrictions 1 1iλ λ=  and 2 2iλ λ=  for all companies i 26, column (1) of Table 4 
confirms the hypothesis that an increasing importance of exports ceteris paribus leads to 
rising exposure, whereas a relative growth of imports diminishes it. Column (2) shows that 
estimated parameters do not arise as a statistical artefact due to some collinearity be-
tween export and import shares.27 Estimated parameters are surprisingly high at first 
glance: Looking at the estimate 6.84 for export share in column (1), an increase of the ex-
port share by one percentage point would lead to an increase of exposure by almost 0.07 
on average. However, exports and imports almost always move in the same direction 
(both positively depend on fluctuations of world trade and the German integration in global 
business cycles; the correlation coefficient amounts to 0.54), such that the usual “ceteris 
paribus condition” has limited appeal in historical situations.28  Confirming results for (exs-
ims) dispel potential doubts that the signs of exports and imports might arise as a spurious 
result of collinearity between both variables. Table 3, column (3), informs about the effect 
of aggregate foreign involvement, calculated as the sum of exports and imports in German 
GDP. In line with other results found in the literature, it can be concluded that the higher 
total foreign involvement is, the higher aggregate exposure of firms is. 
                                            
26 Without this restriction, all 28 estimates of 1iλ are positive, of which 24 are significant. As regards esti-
mated parameters on imports ( 2iλ ), 28 are negative, of which 26 are significant (5%-level). Testing 1 1iλ λ=  
and 2 2iλ λ=  leads to the result of an invalid restriction at the 1% level (F=4.11, critical value = 1.51). In spite 
of this result, Table 4 is limited to the presentation of restricted estimation results in order to focus on aggre-
gate evidence concerning the overall German economy.  
27 An F-Test rejects the hypothesis at the 1% level (F=98.16, critical values at the 5% / 1% level = 3.84 / 
6.64). 
28 Note also the high variation among companies ranging between – 0.90 and 1.26: see Table B, Appendix. 
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The next step is to test whether exposure observed for cross-sections of time series is line 
with the hypothesis of nonlinear adjustment costs, caused by departing from expected 
long-run dollar values. Trials not documented in Table 4 reveal that estimations based on 
the mean value of the sample period (which was 2.083 DM/ $) were statistically inferior to 
results based on the sample median (1.895). Thus, if taken literally, Table 4, cols (4) to (6), 
refer to results on “median reversion” instead of “mean reversion”. The use of ( )t tD m D−  
implies a piecewise linear dependence of exposure on the distance between the dollar and 
its long-run median, with the effect being symmetric around the median. Indeed, Table 4, 
column (4), shows a negative sign which implies that departing from the long-run median 
leads to a smaller itβ . Conditional on corresponding average long-run results (see Table 
2), which show positive exposure estimates, this effect further implies a reduction of firm 
values, confirming the hypothesis of adjustment costs which increase with rising distance 
to expected long-run fundamentals.  
Asymmetries and nonlinearities are accounted for in Table 4, cols (5) and (6). In addition 
to ( )t tD m D− , a polynomial in ( ( ))t tD m D− of 5th order is fitted to the data (column (5)). 
The curvatures of ( ( ))t tf D median D−  from Table 4, column (5) (incl. ( )t tD m D−  ), and from 
Table 4, column (4), i.e. 0.529 ( )t tD m D− − , are depicted in Figure 2. Effects are calculated 
for DM/dollar ratios tD  ranging from 1.39 to 3.36, i.e. between extreme values of the sam-
ple period. We observe that assuming linear effects symmetric to the median fails when tD  
either becomes very small or very high. This conclusion is confirmed by a nonparametric 
approach presented in Table 4, column (6). Using dummy variables, estimations show that 
when the DM/dollar rate exceeds 2.70, then exposure values (and firm values) would be 
reduced by -0.545 with respect to the median reference dummy (1.60 $ 2.00< ≤ ), whereas 
the linearity assumption would predict a much more profound downward reaction. Analo-
gous linear reactions holds for tD  smaller than 1.60.  
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Table 4: Determinants of German Dollar Exposure, 1979-1992 
Model: 0 1 2 ( ( ))it i i t i t i t t itexs ims f D m Dβ λ λ λ ε= + + + − +   
Notes: All estimates include fixed-company effects and are based on seemingly unrelated regressions. Estimation period: 1979:1 – 1992:4 (1568 quarterly observa-
tions). (Asymptotic) standard errors are given in parentheses. **) denotes t-values above 2.58 (conventional 1% significance level).
Explanatory determinants (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exports/GDP 
(exs) 
    6.84** 
 (0.22) 
 
 _ _ 7.68** 
(0.33) 
5.53** 
(0.32) 
 
5.41** 
(0.37) 
 
Imports/GDP 
(ims) 
-10.47** 
(0.34) 
_ _ -8.52** 
(0.51) 
-4.17** 
(0.50) 
 
-4.33** 
(0.58) 
 
exs - ims  7.26** 
(0.20) 
_ _ _ _ 
exs + ims _ _ 0.30** 
(0.06) 
_ _ _ 
( ( )) :t tf D m D−        
• ( )t tD median D−  _ _ _ -0.529** (0.038) -0.171 (0.249) 
 
_ 
 
• $<1.60  _ _ _ _ _ -0.119** 
(0.033) 
• 2.00 $ 2.30< ≤  _ _ _ _ _ -0.216** 
(0.033) 
• 2.30 $ 2.70< ≤  _ _ _ _ _ -0.365** 
(0.024) 
• $ 2.70>  _ _ _ _ _ -0.545** 
(0.029) 
Nonlinear component _ _ _ _ 5
2
( ( )) jj t tj D m Dθ= −∑
 
_ 
2R  0.341 0.299 0.046 0.462 0.603 0.587 
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However, responses appear to be asymmetric. Effects from appreciations of domestic cur-
rency seem to be smaller than from depreciations. Koutmos and Martin (2003) argue that 
exporting firms (with net long positions, i.e. foreign currency receivables) may be inclined 
to hedge against domestic currency appreciations yet remain unhedged against domestic 
currency depreciations, whereas importers (with net short positions, i.e. with foreign cur-
rency payables) may be inclined to hedge domestic currency depreciations yet remain un-
hedged against domestic currency appreciations. Under the assumption that this reason-
able description also holds for German companies, it seems as if German exporters were 
more successful in curbing losses from strong appreciations than importers in cutting 
losses from substantial depreciations.  
Figure 2: Departure from median values, piecewise linear and nonlinear effects  
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 Note: Effects refer to ( ( ))t tf D median D− , Table 4, cols (4), (5). See the text for details. 
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6. Conclusions 
This article analyses value changes of stock market companies in response to exchange 
rate movements, with special focus on exposure of the German stock market in the face of 
variations of the US dollar. Due to its high involvement in international trade, the German 
case should be very well suited for testing the presence of currency exposure. The ap-
proach followed in this work extends the standard way of measuring exchange rate expo-
sure in several ways (e.g. by using multi-factor modelling instead of augmented CAPM, 
application of moving window panel regressions, orthogonalization of overall market risk 
vis-à-vis currency risk), but the main innovation lies in testing implications of exchange rate 
adjustment costs for firm values and exposure. This issue is important, as reducing cur-
rency risks by implementing hedging strategies like use of forward contracts or options is 
costly, and costs increase with rising distance to benchmark values, which we test to be 
related to long-run expectations.   
Based on time series data for German DAX companies, DM/dollar rates and macroeco-
nomic factors, we find a rather unstable, time-variant exposure of German stock market 
companies. Linking estimated exposure to German trade, we arrive at results in line with 
previous outcomes known from the literature. We may conclude that in general (on aver-
age), German exposure is well described through the role of a net exporter, who benefits 
from the depreciation of domestic currency. Accordingly, estimations of time-varying expo-
sure based on dollar risks have a positive sign with exception of the first half of the 
1980ies, when a relatively high import dependency and a strong US Dollar changed the 
situation.  
Our results confirm the hypothesis of significant adjustment costs. Estimates are in accor-
dance with long-run mean (median) reversion and asymmetric adjustment costs. Devia-
tions of exchange rates from their long-run values have a significant impact on exposure. 
We find that the larger is the distance of current exchange rates from their long-median, 
the lower are company values. Moreover, there is evidence that impact curves are nonlin-
ear and asymmetric. Following arguments of Koutmos and Martin (2003), who reason that 
exporting firms may be inclined to hedge mainly against domestic currency appreciations 
(yet remain unhedged against domestic currency depreciations), whereas importers may 
be inclined to hedge domestic currency depreciations (yet remain unhedged against do-
mestic currency appreciations), our results indicate that German exporters were more suc-
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cessful in curbing losses from strong appreciations than importers in cutting losses from 
substantial depreciations. 
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Table A: Descriptive Statistics: Stock values, returns and macroeconomic factors, monthly data, 1977:01 – 1995:03    
 
 
  DAX com-
pany  returns 
( itr ) 
Average 
company  
returns ( tri )
DM/US-$ DM/US-$, re-
turns 
Interest rate 
term structure  
Inflation Business Cli-
mate (ifo) 
Market risk  
(DAFOX) 
DAFOX, re-
turns 
Mean  0.006855  0.006855  2.034474 -0.002287  0.009337  0.030984  0.930831  402.4090  0.007517 
Median  0.007217  0.009790  1.874063 -0.003938  0.014100  0.029400  0.940000  396.8200  0.009532 
Maximum  0.319689  0.141223  3.356831  0.103722  0.036000  0.074600  1.079000  809.7240  0.137507 
Minimum -0.411905 -0.249551  1.393340 -0.090260 -0.037600 -0.010000  0.745000  132.3030 -0.245858 
Std. Dev.  0.070578  0.052028  0.435809  0.034898  0.017685  0.016935  0.075759  215.0022  0.048610 
Observations 6132 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 219 
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Table B:  Descriptive Statistics of exposure, trade and DM /US-Dollar, 1979-1992, quarterly data. 
   
β it  
 
β it  
           
β it  
 
/EX GDP  
 
/IM GDP  
 
/EX GDP  -
/IM GDP  
 
  
/ $DM  
Mean 0.144 0.144 0.312 0.332 0.292 0.050 2.083 
Median 0.120 0.118 0.247 0.331 0.293 0.056 1.895 
Maximum 1.258 0.803 1.258 0.388 0.327 0.077 3.357 
Minimum -0.897 -0.514 0.000 0.271 0.251 -0.009 1.393 
Std. Dev. 0.375 0.313 0.252 0.029 0.019 0.021 0.468 
Observations 1568 56 1568 56 56 56 56 
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Table C: Exchange Rate Exposure of German DAX companies 
Company 1977-1995 1977-1979 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 
 
ALLIANZ AG 0.032 -0.182 -0.379* 0.011 0.226 
BASF AG 0.076 0.150 -0.242* 0.089 0.283* 
BAYER AG 0.034 0.049 -0.254** 0.051 0.190 
BMW AG 0.197* -0.154 -0.153 0.318 0.452* 
BAYER. VEREINS-
BANK AG 
0.094 0.006 -0.328** 0.271 0.148 
COMMERZBANK AG 0.058 0.128 -0.589** 0.540** -0.023 
CONTINENTAL AG 0.135 -0.240 -0.310 0.442 0.260 
DAIMLER-BENZ AG 0.278** 0.032 -0.333** 0.559** 0.612** 
DEGUSSA AG 0.368** 0.215 -0.236 0.738** 0.632** 
DEUTSCHE BANK 
AG 
0.153* 0.065 -0.400** 0.580** 0.139 
DRESDNER BANK 
AG 
-0.046 0.224* -0.681** 0.225 0.012 
DEUTSCHE BAB-
COCK AG 
0.190 0.029 -0.363 0.659** 0.361 
HOECHST AG 0.024 0.030 -0.352** 0.001 0.383** 
BAYER. HYPO-
THEKEN- UND 
WECHSELBANK AG 
0.144 0.080 -0.338* 0.481** 0.063 
KARSTADT AG 0.202 0.259 -0.351 0.347 0.577** 
KAUFHOF AG 0.232* 0.283 -0.340* 0.529* 0.402* 
LINDE AG 0.158* -0.132 -0.255 0.210 0.471** 
LUFTHANSA AG 0.191 0.171 0.149 0.101 0.144 
MAN AG 0.123 -0.217 -0.459** 0.118 0.879** 
MANNESMANN AG 0.144 0.057 -0.397** 0.276 0.517** 
METALLGESELL-
SCHAFT AG 
0.132 -0.009 -0.223 -0.049 0.601 
PREUSSAG AG 0.427* -0.064 -0.099 0.538 0.793** 
RWE AG 0.031 0.040 -0.270* 0.085 0.190 
SCHERING AG 0.163 0.389 -0.219 0.134 0.270 
SIEMENS AG 0.223* 0.212* -0.264** 0.435** 0.329** 
THYSSEN AG 0.198 0.376 -0.208 0.162 0.650** 
VEBA AG -0.009 0.036 -0.407** 0.197 0.028 
VOLKSWAGEN AG 0.067 -0.242 -0.353 0.298 0.094 
Note: Estimations according to specification (5), unrestricted version (see Table 2, column (1)).  
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Table D: Market Betas (overall market risk) 
Company 1977-1995 1977-1979 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 
ALLIANZ AG 1.316 1.150 1.439 1.280 1.301 
BASF AG 0.864 0.706 0.936 0.836 1.123 
BAYER AG 0.876 1.046 1.020 0.872 0.881 
BMW AG 1.193 1.544 1.048 1.316 1.253 
BAYER. VEREINS-
BANK AG 
1.044 1.078 0.868 1.104 1.002 
COMMERZBANK AG 1.111 1.070 1.529 0.972 0.929 
CONTINENTAL AG 0.922 1.313 1.196 0.780 0.800 
DAIMLER-BENZ AG 1.341 1.027 1.299 1.310 1.333 
DEGUSSA AG 0.945 0.912 0.969 0.860 1.222 
DEUTSCHE BANK 
AG 
1.159 0.945 1.363 1.060 1.028 
DRESDNER BANK 
AG 
1.166 0.786 1.470 1.139 0.907 
DEUTSCHE BAB-
COCK AG 
1.090 0.981 1.207 1.014 1.580 
HOECHST AG 0.862 0.843 0.995 0.764 1.170 
BAYER. HYPO-
THEKEN- UND 
WECHSELBANK AG 
1.097 0.911 1.015 1.119 1.033 
KARSTADT AG 0.858 1.035 0.660 0.984 0.875 
KAUFHOF AG 0.951 1.404 0.732 0.901 1.490 
LINDE AG 1.008 1.338 0.990 0.980 1.192 
LUFTHANSA AG 0.934 1.075 0.711 1.070 1.048 
MAN AG 1.129 1.366 1.175 1.098 1.204 
MANNESMANN AG 1.181 1.336 1.081 1.133 1.338 
METALLGESELL-
SCHAFT AG 
1.174 1.683 0.844 1.280 1.645 
PREUSSAG AG 1.108 1.388 0.958 1.140 1.116 
RWE AG 0.785 0.688 0.614 0.830 1.021 
SCHERING AG 0.967 1.203 1.137 0.953 0.833 
SIEMENS AG 1.177 1.007 1.217 1.194 1.066 
THYSSEN AG 1.028 1.174 1.134 1.005 1.263 
VEBA AG 0.810 0.757 0.744 0.811 0.932 
VOLKSWAGEN AG 1.277 1.869 1.332 1.307 1.351 
Note: Estimations according to specification (5), unrestricted version (see Table 2, column (1)). 
 
